Reading about the assertion of a cause that is nonexistent and the assertion about objects that are not-existent as explained by the Buddha in the Lankavatara Sutra.
Again, Mahamati, by the assertion of a cause that is nonexistent is meant that [some philosophers] assume the causeless birth of a first Vijnana, which later comes to have a Maya-like non-existence; that is to say, the originally unborn Vijnana begins to function under the conditions of eye, form, light, and memory. The functioning goes on for a while and then ceases. This, Mahamati, is the assertion of a cause that is non-existent.
Again, Mahamati, the assertion about objects that are not-existent is an assertion arising from the attachment to such non-working existences as space, cessation, and Nirvana. These, Mahamati, are neither existent nor nonexistent; for all things are devoid of the alternatives of being and non-being and are to be known, Mahamati, as the horns of a hare, a horse, or a camel, or like a hair-net. They are discriminated as realities by the ignorant who are addicted to assertions and refutations as their intelligence has not penetrated into the truth that there is nothing but what is seen of the Mind itself. It is otherwise with the wise. This, Mahamati, is the characteristic point of the assertion about objects which are non-existent. For this reason, Mahamati, one should avoid the views based on assertion and refutation.
…the alternatives of being and non-being and are to be known, Mahamati, as the horns of a hare, a horse, or a camel, or like a hair-net.
They aren’t ‘real’. They are imaginary. Mind constructed. Dreamlike.